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and the case was argued on February 20. (See Tax Notes,
Feb. 26, 2001, p. 1151.)
This old-fashioned issue will therefore have another
day in the sun, but none of this should have happened.
With the Federal Circuit deciding as it did and with a
number of federal judges claiming an exemption from
a tax of general application (a rather unseemly position
for judges to tcike publicly), it's understandable the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. But neither the
original understanding nor any other plausible reading
of the Compensation Clause supports an absolute tax
exemption for federal judges, and Evans v. Gore, the
case on which the Federal Circuit relied in Hatter, was
effectively overruled in 1939.5 Originalists and nonoriginalists should be able to agree: The purposes of
the Compensation Clause aren't implicated in Hatter.

I

This old-fashioned issue will have
another day in the sun, but none of
this should have happened.

The Compensation Clause was part of the constitutional structure designed to protect the judiciary
against interference from other governmental
branches, particularly Congress. The concern was judicial independence, not preserving the after-tax incomes
of federal judges. It's certainly true that a tax directed
at specific judges would violate the Compensation
Clause, and it's probably true that a tax directed only
at the judiciary would violate the clause. For that matter, it might even be the case that a facially neutral
statute motivated by a congressional intent to influence
the judiciary would fail constitutional requirements. 6
But those interesting hypotheticals have nothing to do
with Hatter. Requiring that federal judges be subject to
the same taxing scheme applicable to other Americans
shouldn't affect judicial independence at all.
In this article, we examine the merits of the dispute
in Hatter. After a brief description of the specifics of
the case, we discuss two areas that should affect
Hatter's resolution: the original understanding of the
Compensation Clause and the 20th century
jurisprudence on the relationship between the clause
and the taxing power. Both suggest- clearly, we think
- that the Federal Circuit's decision should be
reversed. Along the way we also discuss some 19th
century misunderstandings of the Compensation
Clause.
I. Hatter

The controversies in Hatter are beginning to strain
the capacities of law libraries and electronic databases.
Eight opinions have been issued so far/ and more
words are on the way. Much of the case's procedural

5
See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939); infra Part
IV. C.
6
That's an issue the Supreme Court hasn't yet had toresolve. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 226 n.30 (1980).
7
See supra note 3.
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history is complex - raising questions such as who
can hear the case, 8 and the implications of the Supreme
Court's inability to muster a quorum when the case
was brought there at an earlier stage 9 - but the fundamental, substantive issue is straightforward: Under
the Compensation Clause, can Congress extend analready existing tax of general application to sitting
judges who had previously been exempt from the tax?

The controversies in Hatter are
beginning to strain the capacities of
law libraries and electronic databases.
Eight opinions have been issued so
far, and more words are on the way.
Judge Terry Hatter and several other federal judges
sued in 1989, challenging the application to them of the
wage taxes that fund the social security old-age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) program and
the Medicare hospital insurance program. Before 1983,
most federal employees, including judges, were exempt from social security taxes because of the separate
retirement systems established by the federal government on their behalf. But the Tax Equity and Fiscal

8
At least 10 suits involving almost 100 other federal judges
with similar claims are in the pipeline. See Petition for Certiorari, App. L, United States v. Hatter (No. 99-1978). No members of the Supreme Court have been parties to Hatter or any
of the other cases. See id.; Linda Greenhouse, "Supreme Court
Roundup: Court to Review Benefits Tax on U.S. Judges," N.Y.
Times, Oct. 17, 2000, at A29.
9
Four justices recused themselves when the case reached
the Court in 1996, see 519 U.S. 801 (1996), apparently because
they might have been "entitled to refunds if the plaintiffs'
broadest remedial theory prevail[ed]." Greenhouse, supra
note 8 (noting that only two justices are not participating in
this round, presumably because the passage of time leaves
them as the only members of the Court with a potential
financial stake in the outcome). Because of the four recusals
last time, the Court lacked a quorum of six participating
members. See 28 U.S.C. section L The absence of a quorum
had the effect of affirming, as if by an equally divided Court,
the Federal Circuit's 1995 ruling (64 F.3d 647) that the extension of social security taxes to incumbent Article III judges
violated the Compensation Clause. See 28 U.S.C. section 2109.
Although an affirmance by an equally divided Court has no
precedential significance, such a disposition is said to be
"conclusive and binding" on the parties. See United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942); Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 107, 113 (1868). The Court's 1996 disposition might
therefore represent the law of the case in Hatter. On the other
hand, the law-of-the-case doctrine applies "only with respect
to issues previously determined," Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 347 n.18 (1979), and the 1996 order under section 2109
was not an adjudication of the merits that would trigger that
doctrine. Cf Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409
U.S. 363, 365 n.1 (1973) (finding that an earlier dismissal of
certiorari as improvidently granted was not the law of the
case); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (refusing to treat
the prior affirmance of a state conviction by an equally
divided Court as precluding the defendant from raising a
federal habeas corpus claim).
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Responsibility Act of 1982 subjected federal judges to
the Medicare tax, 10 and the Sodal Security Amendments 6f 1983 imposed the OASDI wage tax on the
judges. 11 Hatter and the otherjudges party to the suit
were already on the bench when the wage taxes became
effective - hence the claim that their compensation
was being unconstitutionally diminished.
The suit focuses on the effect of the social security
taxes on federal judges, but the statutory changes
didn't single out the judges for any special, deleterious
treatment. Congress was trying to increase revenue for
the social security system, and the changes also imposed the wage taxes for the first time on many other
federal officials, including the president, the vice president, cabinet members, and members of Congress. The
statutory changes thus weren't aimed at the judiciary
and, at bottom, the changes merely required treating
most government officials in the same way other
American citizens had been treated for decades. As
we'll demonstrate, that should make every difference
in the world in Hatter.

II. Original Understanding
The Compensation Clause isn't mysterious. It's clear
from the founding debates that the clause was intended
to help protect federal judges from external pressures,
particularly from Congress and the president, that
might keep them from acting impartially. As the
Supreme Court wrote in 1980,
The Compensation Clause has its roots in the
longstanding Anglo-American tradition of an independent Judiciary. A Judiciary free from control
by the Executive and Legislature is essential if
there is a right to have claims decided by judges
who are free from potential domination by other
branches of government. 12
The founders debated whether the clause went far
enough or whether it went too far, but there was no
disagreement about its purpose. That understanding
of the Compensation Clause should make Hatter an
easy case. If a taxing statute imposes no pressure on
the judiciary qua judiciary or on individual judges, its
application shouldn't be limited by the Compensation
Clause.
The founders realized that life tenure, while a critical element in protecting judicial independence, wasn't
enough by itself. A guaranteed job wouldn't mean
much if a judge's compensation could be tied to the
content of his decisions. As Justice Story put it in 1833,
"Without [the Compensation Clause], the other [provision], as to the tenure of office, would have been utterly
nugatory, and indeed a mere mockery." 13 How impar-

10
Pub. L. No. 97-248, Tit. II, Subtit. E, Pt. III, section 278, 96
Stat. 324, 559-63 (amending 26 U.S.C. section 3121).
11
Pub. L. No. 98-21, section 101(b)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 69
(amending 26 U.S.C. section 3121).
12
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980).
13
Jos~ph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States section 844, at 602 (Ronald D. Rotunda and John
E. Novak eds., 1987) (1833).
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tial would a judge be if he knew that Congress might
adjust his salary downward when he didn't decide
cases in the congressionally desired way or that Congress might give him a bonus when he acted as
desired? Alexander Hamilton explained in the first sentence of The Federalist No. 79, "Next to permanency in
office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their
support." 14
This wasn't a hypothetical concern for the founders.
The Declaration of Independence condemned King
George because he had "made Judges dependent on
his Will alone; for the Tenure of their Offices, and the
Amount and Payment of their Salaries." 15 That history
pointed to the importance of both life tenure and the
Compensation Clause in protecting judges from the
sovereign's commands.
In 1787, the King was out of the picture, of course,
but the fundamental issue hadn't changed. As
Alexander Hamilton noted in 1802, "From the injunction, that the compensation of the Judges shall not be
diminished, it is manifest that the Constitution intends
to guard the independence of those Officers against the
Legislative Department: Because, to this department
alone would have belonged the power of diminishing
· their compensations." 16

The Compensation Clause isn't
mysterious. It's clear from the
founding debates that the clause was
intended to help protect federal judges
from external pressures that might
keep them from acting impartially.
That passage from Hamilton restates what everyone
was saying about the purpose of the Compensation
Clause at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and
during the later ratification debates. Two questions
were discussed in the founding debates: whether judicial compensation should be absolutely fixed for any
sitting judge so as to protect his independence, and (an
Anti-Federalist concern) whether the clause helped
give too much independence to federal judges. We'll
now discuss those two questions, with the goal of demonstrating that no one at the time of the founding had
any doubt about the purpose of the clause.

A. The Permissibility of Raises in Compensation
Some founders thought the Compensation Clause
didn't go far enough to protect judicial impartiality.
James Madison, for a very important example, wanted

14
The Federalist No. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
15
Some of the history of this issue, including English antecedents to the Compensation Clause, can be found in United
States v. Wilt 449 U.S. 200, 217-21 (1980).
16
Alexander Hamilton, The Examination, No. 12 (Feb. 23,
1802), reprinted in 4 The Founders' Constitution 175, 175 (Philip
B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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to make sure Congress couldn't change a judge's compensation at all. Indeed, the resolution that was the
basis for the first debate on judicial compensation at
the Constitutional Convention, a resolution introduced
by Edmund Randolph of Virginia and sponsored by
the Virginia delegation, including Madison, provided
that the National Judiciary should "receive punctually
at stated times fixed compensation for their services,
in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as
to affect the persons actually in office at the time of
such increase or diminution." 17 That is, all adjustments
in compensation, upward as well as downward, would
have been forbidden for any sitting judge.
When this provision of the Virginia plan was first
debated at the Convention, on July 11, Gouverneur
Morris (representing Pennsylvania) moved that the
words "or increase" should be struck because "the
Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries as
circumstances might require, and ... this would not
create any improper dependence in the Judges," 18 Benjamin
Franklin agreed that increases in compensation should
be permitted: "Money may not only become plentier,
but the business of the [judicial] department may increase as the Country becomes more populous." 19
Avoiding "improper dependence" was the universally acknowledged goal. Madison understood that
preventing a reduction in compensation was more important than preventing an increase, but he was still
bothered by the prospect of judges interested in higher
compensation trying to curry favor with Congress
through their decisions:
The dependence will be less if the increase alone
should be permitted, but it will be improper even
so far to permit a dependence. Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be in agitation in the legislature, an undue complaisance in
the former may be felt towards the latter. If at
such a crisis there should be in Court suits to
which leading members of the Legislature may
be parties, the Judges will be in a situation which
ought not to be suffered, if it can be prevented. 20
But there was an obvious practical problem with
capping compensation. Inflation could erode the economic position of sitting judges, and good judges
might therefore leave for greener pastures. Life tenure
isn't a protection if no one can afford to serve for long. 21

17

1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21-22
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (May 29, 1787) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Farrand].
18
2 id. at 44 (July 18, 1787) (emphasis added). If Madison
reported the language of the resolution correctly, the motion
should have been to delete "increase or," but nothing in our
argument turns on the placement of the "or."
19
Id. at 44-45.
20
Id. at 45.
21
The president's situation is different. While his compensation "shall neither be increased nor diminished during the
period for which he shall have been elected," U.S. Const. art.
II, section 1, cl. 7, the presidency wasn't expected to be a
lifetime position and in any event had a fixed term. See id.
cl. 1; The Federalist No. 79, supra note 14, at 473.
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Rather than setting compensation at a specific dollar
figure, Madison therefore suggested, why not tie fixed
compensation to some always valuable commodity?
He proposed that "[t]he variations in the value of
money, may be guarded [against] by taking for a standard wheat or some other thing of permanent value." 22
Linking judicial compensation to wheat is an interesting idea, but Gouverneur Morris pointed out the
difficulty:
The value of money may not only alter but the
State of Society may alter. In this event the same
quantity of wheat, the same value would not be
the same compensation. The Amount of salaries
must always be regulated by the manners & the
style of living in a Country. 23
Morris prevailed on this point, and the prohibition
against any "increase" was struck from the draft Clause
by a substantial vote.
Madison didn't give up. In late August, he and
James McHenry of Maryland tried to reinstate the prohibition against increases in judicial compensation,
and, after Morris repeated how unlikely it was that any
particular asset would maintain a constant value as
conditions changed, George Mason spoke in favor of
the Madison-McHenry motion. Maybe new judges will
have to be paid more if the country is going to maintain
a quality judiciary, but that doesn't mean sitting judges
should be entitled to more: "There was no weight ...
in the argument drawn from changes in the value of
the metals, because this might be provided for by an
increase of salaries so made as not to affect persons in
office, and this was the only argument on which much
stress seemed to have been laid." 24
Madison and his supporters lost again. General
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina
responded to Mason, questioning the desirability of a
multi-tiered compensation system, particularly if the
more senior judges were likely to be paid less:
The importance of the Judiciary will require men
of the first talents; large salaries will therefore be
necessary, larger than the U.S. can allow in the
first instance. He was not satisfied with the expedient mentioned by Col. Mason. He did not
think it would have a good effect or a good appearance, for new Judges to come in with higher
salaries than old ones. 25
Gouverneur Morris added that a prohibition on increases for sitting judges would be easy to circumvent:
"[T]he expedient might be evaded & therefore
amounted to nothing. Judges might resign, & then be
re-appointed to increased salaries." 26 The MadisonMcHenry motion was defeated, as was another motion
made by Madison and Randolph that would have
added the following words to the Compensation

22

2 Farrand, supra note 17, at 45 (July 18, 1787).
23Id.
24
Id. at 429 (Aug. 27, 1787).
25
Id. at 429-30.
26
Id. at 430.
TAX NOTES, March 12, 2001
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Clause: "nor increased by any Act of the Legislature
which shall operate before the expiration of three years
after the passing thereof." 27
Throughout these debates at the Convention no one
questioned that the goal of the Compensation Clause
was to protect judicial impartiality. The founders knew
that, while their solutions to the problem were imperfect, they were a lot better than nothing. The most
extensive discussion of the Compensation Clause in its
final form is found in Hamilton's The Federalist No. 79.
Hamilton explained why a fixed salary wouldn't work,
if the country was going to keep good people in office, 28
but it was still necessary to have "restrictions as to put
it out of the power of that body [Congress] to change
the condition of the individual for the worse. A man
may then be sure of the ground upon which he stands,
and can never be deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situation."29 Congress shouldn't be able even to contemplate
a reduction in the compensation of individual judges.
The threat of such a reduction might deter a judge from
his duty, and a "power over a man's subsistence amounts
to a power over his will." 30 If such a threat isn't involved,
however, the Compensation Clause ought to be irrelevant.

B. The Fear of Excessive Judicial Independence
The Anti-Federalists raised a different question
about the Compensation Clause and the other provisions protecting judicial impartiality. Unlike James
Madison, they worried that the Constitution provided
too much independence for the judiciary. For example,
Anti-Federalist "Brutus" complained in 1788 that
"[t]hey have made the judges independent, in the {ullest
sense of the word. There is no power above them, to
controul any of their decisions. There is no authority
that can remove them, and they cannot be controuled
by the laws of the legislature." 31
Another Anti-Federalist, known as the "Federal
Farmer," while more restrained than Brutus, also concluded the Convention had gone overboard. The
Clause prevented the legislature from taking the sensible step of reducing judicial salaries across the board
should economic conditions warrant:
The same judge may frequently be in office thirty
or forty years; there may often be times, as in

27Jd.
28
"It will readily be understood, that the fluctuations in
the value of money and in the state of society rendered a
fixed rate of compensation in the constitution inadmissible.
What might be extravagant today, might in half a century
become penurious and inadequate." The Federalist No. 79,
supra note 14, at 473.
29Jd.
30
ld. at 472; see also id. at 473 ("The salaries of judicial
offices may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall
require, yet never so as to lessen the allowance with which
any particular judge comes into office, in respect of him.").
31
Essay of Brutus, No. 15 (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 The
Complete Anti-Federalist 437, 438-39 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981).
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cases of war, or very high prices, when his salary
may reasonably be increased one half or more; in
a few years money may become scarce again, and
prices fall, and his salary, with equal reason and
propriety be decreased and lowered: not to suffer
this to be done by consent of all the branches of
the legislature, is, I believe, quite a novelty in the
affairs of government. 32
These Anti-Federalist concerns weren't reflected in
the final version of the Compensation Clause. But even
the most ardent Anti-Federalists supported the
proposition that the judiciary should be protected at
least to some extent,33 and the real danger- the danger
that a well-crafted Compensation Clause should
protect against- was legislative and executive action
directed specifically at the judiciary.

C. The Founding and Taxation
Of course there's nothing in the founding debates
about the relationship between income taxes and the
Compensation Clause because there was no original
understanding that anyone's income or wages might be
taxed. 34 Accordingly, we can't say for sure what the
founders would have thought about taxing the income
or wages of federal judges. But we have a pretty good
idea. It's hard to see how a tax that reaches everyone's
income, including that of judges, would have raised
any serious concern about judicial independence.
There's nothing in the founding debates to suggest
federal judges were to be exempt from the taxes that
the founders did expect to be imposed, such as duties
on imports. 35 And the national direct taxes on real es-

32
Letter No. 15 from the Federal Farmer to the Republican
(Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 Storing, supra note 31, at 315,
318-19.
33
For example, Brutus approvingly referred to the British
practice of having "fixed salaries" for judges. Essay of
Brutus, No. 15, supra note 31, at 438.
·
34
The Articles of Confederation had effectively given the
central government no revenue power, other than requisitioning funds from the states. See Erik M. Jensen and
Jonathan L. Entin, "Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment,
and the Federal Requisition Power: New York v. United States
Revisited," 15 Canst. Comm. 353 (1998). In these circumstances, merely permitting the government to levy duties on
imports was such a major increase in the national taxing
power that a tax on income was almost unimaginable.
In any event, if an income tax had been imagined, it would
have been understood to be subject to the direct-tax apportionment rule, U.S. Const. art. I, section 2, cl. 3; art. I, section
9, cl. 4 - or so one of us believes. In Jensen's view, the
Supreme Court was right in 1895 when it struck down an
income tax on the ground that it was a direct tax that hadn't
been properly apportioned among the states on the basis of
population. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 157 U.S. 429
(1895), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). See Erik M. Jensen, "The Apportionment of 'Direct' Taxes: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?" 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2334, 2366-75 (1997).
35
The founders thought the burden of such indirect taxes
would be borne by purchasers. See Jensen, supra note 34, at
2393-97. As far as we know, no one thought a judge purchasing imported goods should be immune from the effects of an
impost.
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tate that were enacted beginning in 1798- and apportioned to meet the requirements of the direct-tax
clauses of the Constitution36 - contained no exemptions for federal judges, even though such a tax would
obviously have "diminished" the economic position of
any judge subject to the tax. 37

III. Nineteenth Century Variations
Some 19th century developments don't reflect this
understanding of the Compensation Clause; they show
confusion about the purposes of the clause. There was
some sentiment that the clause limited Congress's
power to tax the income of federal judges, but the
question was never specifically ruled on by any court.
When Congress enacted the Civil War income tax, 38
Chief Justice Taney protested to the Secretary of the
Treasury against applying the tax to judges: "The act
in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the compensation of every judge three per cent, and if it can be
diminished to that extent by the name of a tax, it may
in the same way be reduced from time to time at the
pleasure of the legislature. " 39
Taney conceded the impropriety of litigating his objections to the tax, 40 but his position received a sympathetic response soon afterward. In 1869, Attorney
General Hoar issued an opinion stating that a tax on
judicial salaries would violate the Compensation

36
See U.S. Const. art. I, section 2, cl. 3; art. I, section 9, cl. 4;
see also Jensen, supra note 34, at 2355-56 (discussing direct

taxes on real estate enacted between 1798 and 1861).
37
See, e.g., Act ofJuly 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597. Of course,
the measure of such a tax wouldn't have been "compensation," as we generally understand the term. But if the concern
under the Compensation Clause is only whether a judge is
hurt economically by a new tax - and that has to be the
argument at the foundation of Judge Hatter's case -why
should we care whether $100 in taxes is paid pursuant to
something called an income tax or something called a property tax?
38
A 3 percent tax was initially applied to "all salaries of
officers, or payments to persons in the ... service of the
United States," Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, section 86, 12 Stat.
432, 472, which was interpreted to include the president and
the judiciary.
39
Letter from R.B. Taney to Hon. S.P. Chase (Feb. 16, 1863),
reprinted in 157 U.S. 701, 701 (1895). At Taney's request, this
letter was made part of the Court's records by an order dated
March 10, 1863, see id., but was not published for another 32
years. The letter appears in the same volume of the U.S.
Reports that contairu? tne first decision in the Income Tax Cases,
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). We
don't know whether this was coincidental.
40
See 157 U.S. at 702 (observing that "all of the judges of
the courts of the United States have an interest in the question, and could not therefore with propriety undertake to
hear and decide it"). Twentieth century judges have been less
reluctant to entertain Compensation Clause claims by their
brethren even in situations where they have a financial stake
in the outcome. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
211-17 (1980) (invoking the Rule of Necessity).
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Clause. 41 Four years later, the government refunded the
taxes paid by federal judges. 42 Justice Field, too, subsequently questioned the validity of taxing judges'
salaries. 43
Despite Taney's self-serving claim that the indirect
effects of an income tax on judicial salaries might create
"the suspicion of [undue] influence" 44 - a claim underlying the other objections as well- it's hard to see
how those suspicions could have developed or why the
judges deserved a refund. The Civil War income tax
didn't fall only, or primarily, on judges. Where's the
possible influence on the judiciary?

IV. Twentieth Century Jurisprudence
We've demonstrated, to our satisfaction at least, that
the original understanding of the Compensation
Clause doesn't preclude imposing a tax of general application on sitting federal judges. And we're equally
convinced that Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
Compensation Clause, despite the 19th century diversions and another false start in 1920, supports the same
conclusion. Yes, Evans v. Gore45 (1920} and Miles v.
Graham46 (1925), if they remained good law, would
preclude the taxes at issue in Hatter. But those cases
aren't good law; they aren't even close. They
misinterpreted the Compensation Clause, and the
Court in 1939, in O'Malley v. Woodrough, 47 gutted both
cases. Moreover, while the Court in United States v.
Will,48 decided in 1980, vigorously applied the Compensation Clause to strike down the retroactive repeal
of judicial cost-of-living increases (one of which had
been in place for only a few hours), that case in no way
revives the properly discredited understanding of
Evans.
If there's nothing left of Evans v. Gore, there's nothing to Judge Hatter's case. We think Evans was wrongly
41
13 Op. Att'y Gen. 161 (1869). But a 1919 opinion by Attorney General Palmer found the objections to such taxes
unpersuasive after a more thorough review than Hoar had
undertaken. See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 475 (1919). The Supreme
Court nonetheless reaffirmed Attorney General Hoar's
opinion the following year. See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245,

258-59 (1920).
42
See Wayne v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 274, 290 (1891). The
Wayne court noted "the general acquiescence of the profession" in the impropriety of taxing judges, id., but didn't

address the constitutionality of the practice. Instead, the case
concerned a claim by the estate of Justice Wayne to recover
the amount owed him after his refund warrant was stolen
before delivery. See id. at 275-76.
43
Field concurred in the invalidation of the 1894 income
tax, pointing to the application of the tax to federal judges
as one of many reasons why he thought the tax had to fall.
See Pollock v. Farmers' Bank & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 604-06
(1895).
44
157 U.S. at 702. It's self-serving in that it supports exemption from tax. It's hardly self-serving in the image it

presents of the judiciary.
45

253
268
47
307
48
449
46

u.s. 245 (1920).
u.s. 501 (1925).
u.s. 277 (1939).
u.s. 200 (1980).
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decided to begin with- it was inconsistent with the
purposes of the Compensation Clause- but, even if
we're wrong about that, we'll run through the cases to
demonstrate why Evans hasn't withstood the test of
time.
A. Evans v. Gore
In the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax
statute, the compensation of federal judges was exempted from the tax. 49 In general, Congress, feeling its
way slowly because the boundaries of the Amendment
were unclear, drafted the Income Tax Law of 1913 conservatively, not seeking to tax many items that might
have been within congressional power. 50

Yes, Evans v. Gore and Miles v.
Graham, if they remained good law,
would preclude the taxes at issue in
Hatter. But those cases aren't good
law; th~y aren't even close.
Wartime revenue needs overcame congressional
conservatism, however, and, in the Revenue Act of
1918, Congress extended the tax base, "including in the
case of the President of the United States [and] the
judges of the Supreme and inferior courts of the United
States ... the compensation received as such. "51 A
federal judge appointed to the bench in 1899, long
before the effective date of the Act - and, for that
matter, long before the Sixteenth Amendment began its
move through the state legislatures in 1909 - challenged the application of the Revenue Act to him, culminating in the Supreme Court's 1920 decision in Evans
v. Gore. 52
The Supreme Court concluded the tax was invalid
under the Compensation Clause. Despite a dissent

49
See Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, section II.B., 38 Stat.
114, 168 ("in computing net income under this section there
shall be excluded ... the compensation ... of the judges of the
supreme and inferior courts of the United States now in office").
50
After the Supreme Court had rejected the 1894 income
tax as a direct tax that hadn't been properly apportioned
among the states on the basis of population, the Sixteenth
Amendment removed "taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived," from the apportionment requirement. U.S.
Const. amend. XVI. But the early post-Amendment Congresses generally took a restrained view of what could be included in "income." For example, Congress didn't try to tax
dividends representing the distribution of pre-1913 corporate
earnings, although the Supreme Court later suggested that
would have been within congressional power. See Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 204 (1920). And Congress didn't try
to tax appreciation in the value of property from the pre-1913
period, even if the realization of the appreciation occurred
after ratification ofthe Amendment. See Revenue Act of 1918,
ch. 18, section 202(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (providing that
basis of "property acquired before March 1, 1913, [would be]
the fair market value of such property as of that date").
51
Ch. ,18, section 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065.
52
253 u.s. 245 (1920).
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from Justice Holmes, 53 the majority opinion, written by
Justice Van Devanter, reads as if this case were a nobrainer. The opinion is striking in its failure to examine
the purposes of the Compensation Clause, except at the
most abstract level. No diminution in compensation
means no income tax, regardless of whether the tax
reaches other government officials, regardless of
whether it's a tax that applies generally. At no point
did the Court make a serious effort to explain what the
danger to the judiciary was from a tax of general application. The Court quoted extensively from many of
the usual suspects concerning judicial independence,
but never tied that discussion to the particulars of the
case before it. 54
B. Miles v. Graham
In Evans, the Court hadn't seemed to rely on the fact
that the judge was already sitting when the Revenue
Act of 1918 went into effect, but some suggested that
fact might have been crucial to the result. If a judge
assumes office after a tax is already on the books- so
that he can do the calculations about his future economic position taking the tax into account - what
possible claim is there that his compensation has been
diminished by the tax? 55 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court, in 1925, in Miles v. Graham,56 concluded that such
a judge was also protected from federal income taxation.
Judge Graham's appointment was effective September 1, 1919, after the Revenue Act of 1918 was in place.
So, asked Justice McReynolds, "[d]oes the circumstance
that [Graham's] appointment came after the taxing act

53
Holmes thought the tax would have been valid anyway,
see id. at 265 (Holmes, J., dissenting), but he also suggested
that the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment should have
removed all doubt, by permitting an unapportioned tax on
incomes "from whatever source derived." Id. at 267. We doubt
the significance of Holmes's alternative argument. As Justice
Van Devanter pointed out in the majority opinion, there's
substantial evidence that the Amendment wasn't intended to
overturn preexisting immunities from taxation. New York
Governor Charles Evans Hughes raised such a question, in
initially resisting his state's ratification of the Amendment,
because he feared the Amendment might have overturned the
understanding that state and local bond interest couldn't be
reached by an unapportioned income tax. But the Evans Court
noted that Hughes's concern "promptly brought forth from
statesmen who participated in proposing the Amendment
such convincing expositions of its purpose ... that the apprehension was effectively dispelled and ratification followed." Id. at 261. Such interest can be taxed today because
of a change in intergovernmental immunity law, not because
the Court has changed its view of what the Amendment did:
"[If the Amendment] had frozen into the Constitution all the
tax immunities that existed in 1913, then most of intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine would be invalid." South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 522 n.12 (1988); Nevertheless,
"[t]he legislative history ... shows that ... the sole purpose of
[the Amendment] was to remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were otherwise taxable." Id.
54
See Evans, 253 U.S. at 249-53.
55
See 1 Boris I. Bittker and Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts para. 1.2.7 (3d ed. 1999).
56
268 u.s. 501 (1925).

1547

COMMENTARY /SPECIAL REPORT

require a different view concerning his right to exemption?"57 The answer (for all but dissenting Justice Brandeis) was No:
The words and history of the clause indicate that
the purpose was to impose upon Congress the
duty definitely to declare what sum shall be
received by each judge out of the public funds
and the times for payment. When this duty has
been complied with, the amount specified become the compensation which is protected
against diminution during his continuance in office. 58
The applicable statute said Judge Graham should be
paid $7,500 and that, said Justice McReynolds, was
that.
C. O'Malley v. Woodrough
In 1939, the Court revisited the Compensation
Clause in O'Malley v. Woodrough. 59 In the Revenue Act
of 1932, Congress had provided that the statutory term
"gross income" would include compensation of
"judges of courts of the United States taking office after
June 6, 1932."60 Judge Woodrough, fitting within that
defined category, brought suit, reasonably arguing
that, under Miles v. Graham, the tax couldn't be applied
to federal judges.

I

The difference between the Court's
analysis in 1939 and the two cases
from the 1920s is the difference
between night and day.

The difference between the Court's analysis in 1939
and the two cases frmn the 1920s is the difference between night and day. Justice Frankfurter reexamined
the Compensation Clause and concluded that the tax
at issue didn't affect judicial independence, which is
what the clause is all about. Moreover, it obviously
irritated the Court that Judge Woodrough was seeking
to avoid the civic obligations of ordinary citizens;
judges ought to pay their share of the costs of civilization. Some samples from the Frankfurter opinion suggest its scope:
The meaning which Evans v. Gore imputed to the
history which explains Article III, section 1 was
contrary to the way in which it was read by other
English-speaking courts. 61
To suggest that [the tax] makes inroads upon the
independence of judges who took office after

57

Id. at 508.
Id. at 508-09.
59
307 u.s. 277 (1939).
6
°Ch. 209, section 22(a), 47 Stat. 169, 178, reenacted by Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, section 22(a), 49 Stat. 1648, 1657. It
wasn't until1954 that statutory provisions specifically taxing
judicial salaries were eliminated as surplusage. See S. Rep.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1954); 1 Bittker and Lokken, supra note 55, para. 1.2.7.
61
0'Malley, 307 U.S. at 281.
58

1548

Congress had thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear
their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the
Government, is to trivia:lize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article III, section 1.62
To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their
particular function in government does not
generate an immunity from sharing with their
fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are
charged with administering. 63
To be sure, one sentence quoted above alludes to the
fact that Judge Woodrough was appointed after the tax
was extended to members of the judiciary, but a fair
reading of Justice Frankfurter's opinion shows that this
statement merely reflects the particular details of the
lawsuit. Nothing in O'Malley supports a constitutional
distinction between incumbent judges and new judges
for tax purposes. Justice Frankfurter began his discussion with the first quotation, which strongly condemned the approach taken in Evans v. Gore, and the
rest of his analysis applies to all judges -whenever
they were appointed.
The reasoning in O'Malley is totally inconsistent
with that in Evans and Miles. Nevertheless, Justice
Frankfurter said nothing directly about the continuing
vitality of Evans, and he couldn't even bring himself to
say that Miles had been entirely overturned.
Frankfurter wrote only that "to the extent that what
the Court now says is inconsistent with what was said
in Miles v. Graham, the latter cannot survive." 64 Miles
was clearly rejected in its entirety, however, and
Frankfurter's logic cannot be limited to that decision.
Because Miles rested exclusively on Evans, the repudiation of Miles necessarily eviscerated Evans as well. 65

D. United States v. Will
This interpretation was confirmed in the 1980 case
of United States v. Will, 66 a case that has attracted more
attention for its discussion of the propriety of the
Supreme Court's addressing the merits of a lawsuit
about judicial salaries than for its discussion of the
Compensation Clause. In Will, the Court held that certain retroactive cancellations of scheduled cost-ofliving raises for federal judges violated the clause, even
though the cancellation affected members of the other

62
Id. at 282.
63Jd.
64
Id. at 282-83.
65
If Evans remained good law after O'Malley, the Compensation Clause presumably would require the maintenance of
the real, rather than the nominal, value of judicial salaries.
But the Court of Claims, relying heavily on O'Malley, rejected
this argument in a case brought by a group of Article Ill
judges whose salaries had declined in real terms by 34.4
percent over a six-year period. See Atkins v. United States, 556
F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
66
449 u.s. 200 (1980).
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government branches as well. 67 Despite the general
character of the cancellations, the Court wrote that
"[t]he inclusion in the freeze of other officials who are
not protected by the Compensation Clause does not
insulate a direct diminution in judges' salaries from the
clear mandate of that Clause; the Constitution makes
no exceptions for 'nondiscriminatory' reductions." 68
1. O'Malley and Evans. Although the extension of social security taxes to which Judge Hatter objects is also
nondiscriminatory, Will doesn't help his position. Hatter is challenging a reduction in his net pay, not his
gross salary -:--- which was the issue in Will. In subjecting Article III judges to the taxes at issue in Hatter,
Congress treated them the same way it treated highlevel officials of the legislative and executive branches
and the same way that virtually all other citizens are
treated. For this reason, the purposes of the Compensation Clause aren't implicated in the case. As the Will
Court presciently noted: "This is quite different from
the situation in O'Malley .... There the Court held that
the Compensation Clause was not offended by an income tax levied on Article III judges as well as on other
taxpayers; there was no discrimination against the
plaintiff judge." 69 Like Judge Woodrough, Judge Hatter
is suffering no discrimination when compared with the
rest of the American population and therefore nounconstitutional diminution in salary: /iin O'Malley . ..
this Court held that the immunity in the Compensation
Clause would not extend to exempting judges from
paying taxes, a duty shared by all citizens. The Court
thus recognized that the Compensation Clause does
not forbid everything that might adversely affect
judges." 70

We hate to think that the judges are
suggesting that their impartiality on
the bench might be affected by their
having been forced to become part of
the social security system.
If all of that isn't clear enough, the Will Court noted
what had been apparent for decades- that O'Malley
had left Evans staggering, even if not officially down
for the count. Pointing to Justice Frankfurter's statement
in O'Malley that "to the extent Miles v. Graham ... was
inconsistent, it 'cannot survive,"' the Will Court noted
the obvious: uBecause Miles relied on Evans v. Gore,

67
The Court upheld the prospective cancellation of other
pay raises, finding no Compensation Clause violation in withholding from judges (as well as high-level executive officials
and members of Congress) projected salary increases that had
never taken effect. See id. at 229; see also Williams v. United
States, 2001 WL 128053 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting Compensation Clause challenge to prospective cancellation of judicial
pay raises).
68
Will, 449 U.S. at 226.

69[d.
70

Id. at 227 n.31.
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O'Malley must also be read to undermine the reasoning
of Evans . ... " 71
Yes, it must be read that way, and that's why
Supreme Court jurisprudence doesn't support Judge
Hatter's claim.
2. Another rationale for the Compensation Clause?
But perhaps we've been looking at the purpose of the
Compensation Clause too narrowly. Maybe the clause
furthers another goal, as the Court suggested in Will:
This Court has recognized that the Compensation
Clause also serves another, related purpose. As
well as promoting judicial independence, it ensures a prospective judge that, in abandoning
private practice - more often than not more
lucrative than the bench- the compensation of
the new post will not diminish. Beyond doubt,
such assurance has served to attract able lawyers
to the bench and thereby enhances the quality of
justice. 72
While it's true that the Compensation Clause can have
effects on recruiting, we're skeptical this was a "purpose" of the clause at the founding. 73 But even if the
clause can be justified as a way of making judicial
service more attractive, this rationale doesn't apply to
a tax that affects the population as a whole. If a potential judge is going to be subject to social security taxes
whether he takes a judicial post or not, the quality of
the judiciary shouldn't suffer because of the tax. 74
E. Interring Evans
Since the Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled Evans v. Gore, the Federal Circuit in Hatter concluded that Evans was still good law. 75 But that's wishful thinking. Everything Justice Frankfurter said in
O'Malley about the purposes of the Compensation
Clause suggested that the intellectual foundation for
Evans had been destroyed, as Will recognized.
Frankfurter's failure to state explicitly that Evans had
been overruled reflected judicial caution, nothing
more. Evans and O'Malley can't both be the law.

71[d.
72
Id. at 220-21 (citing Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 253 (1920);
1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 276 (1826)).
73
Removing the prohibition on increases in the first version
of what became the Compensation Clause was certainly intended to make attracting qualified judges easier, see supra
text accompanying note 25, but that's not the same as saying
the purpose of the clause was to help prospective judges
resist the enticements of law practice.
74
0£ course, eliminating taxes on the income of federal
judges could be a backdoor way of increasing their real compensation, and the argument has been made that Judge Hatter should prevail precisely because higher compensation is
needed to attract good people. As salaries for new law firm
associates skyrocket, one can applaud the sentiment, but we
shouldn't conflate policy arguments and the requirements of
constitutional law.
75
See 64 F.3d 647, 650 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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The absence of "the magic word 'overruled"' 76 can't
resurrect Evans. The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education 77 didn't expressly overrule Plessy v. Ferguson,78 either. The Brown Court simply "rejected"
statements in Plessy that were contrary to "modern
[psychological] authority" 79 and "conclude[d] that in
the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place." 80 Nevertheless, many subsequent cases have said that Brown really did overrule
Plessy,81 and certainly everyone thinks that's what happened.82 Brown did to Plessy what O'Malley did to

Evans.
The Supreme Court's reluctance to overrule
moribund precedents hasn't prevented lower courts
from recognizing their lack of vitality. Perhaps the most
notable example is Barnette v. West Virginia State Board
of Education, 83 where the district court foresightedly
declined to follow the two-year-old precedent of
Minersville School District v. Gobitis 84 because of
evidence that the Supreme Court no longer regarded
that ruling as sound but had not formally interred it. 85
In fact, several lower courts have remarked on the
apparent demise of Evans v. Gore despite the Supreme

76
Jefferson County v. Acker, 210 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir.
2000), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 22, 2000) (No. 00-455).
77
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
78
163 u.s. 537 (1896).
79
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
80
Id. at 495.
81
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864
(1992) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ.); id. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and
Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
191 (1989) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing
Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 152 n.6 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 133 (1970)
82
For example, the lower court in the case that led to the
end of the Montgomery bus boycott was quite confident that
Plessy hadn't survived Brown. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F.
Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala.) (three-judge court), aff' d per curiam
352 u.s. 903 (1956).
83
47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (three-judge court),
afj'd 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
84
310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia St. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
85
See 47 F. Supp. at 253. For other examples of "anticipatory overruling" by lower courts, see MargaretN. Kniffin, "Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by United States Courts of Appeals," 51 Fordham L. Rev.
53, 61-69 (1982).
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Court's failure to repudiate it explicitly. 86 It's perhaps
understandable that the Federal Circuit has refused to
treat Evans as a dead letter in light of the Supreme
Court's recent insistence that lower courts follow all
high court precedents, however fragile they might appear, until the justices~ themselves apply the coup de
grace. 87 That's why the Court should take the opportunity presented in Hatter to overrule Evans once and
for all.
V. Conclusion
The position taken by the federal judges prosecuting
the Hatter case requires reading the Compensation
Clause in a mindlessly literal way, and, even then, it's
not the only literalist interpretation imaginable.
("Compensation," as that term is used in many contexts, is not diminished by imposition of a tax. An
income tax obviously affects after-tax income; it
doesn't affect the level of salary paid by an employer
to employee, at least not directly.) Certainly the judges'
reading requires ignoring the primary purpose of the
Compensation Clause, to protect judicial independence. And we hate to think that the judges are
suggesting that their impartiality on the bench might
be affected by their having been forced to become part
of the social security system.
There's some superficial plausibility to the judges'
claim because the legislation extending the social security taxes to federal judges wasn't a statute of general
application. It singled out government officials for the
new, unhappy consequences. But it didn't single out
the judiciary, a fact that should make some difference,
and it effectively required only that federal judges be
treated like other American citizens. If Congress could
have included judges in the social security system to
begin with, and we have no doubt on that score, surely
Congress shouldn't be precluded from legislating to
correct an earlier excess of caution.

86
See, e.g., Jefferson County v. Acker, 210 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2000) (noting that the Court in O'Malley and Will "came
as close to overruling [Evans] as it could without actually
uttering the word"), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 22, 2000) (No.
00-455); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1043 (Ct. CL
1977) (en bane) (characterizing Evans as "no longer good law"),
cert. denied 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); id. at 1044 (observing that
O'Malley "by force of reasoning overruled a good deal of
Evans"); id. at 1045 (referring to the "overruling" of Evans in
O'Malley).
87
See Agostiniv. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997}; Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989).
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In the March 12 issue of Tax Notes, we characterized
United States v. Hatter, 1 which had been argued before
the Supreme Court on February 20, as a slam-dunk
case. 2 Exhibiting the doubt-free perspective of law
professors, we saw no good reason for the Court to
strike down the extension of the old-age, survivors,
and disability insurance (OASDI) tax and the Medicare
tax to federal judges on the bench in 1983. 3 By bringing
judges into the social security system, Congress merely
acted to subject judges to the same taxes applicable to
the rest of us, or so we argued, not to diminish the
judges' compensation in a way forbidden by the Compensation Clause of the Constitution. 4 Furthermore, we

argued that Evans v. Gore, 5 the 1920 Supreme Court case
on which the Federal Circuit had relied in holding for
the judges in Hatter, had been dead for more than 60
years and deserved an official funeral. 6
On May 21, the Court issued its decision in Hatter.
Not surprisingly, the Court tossed the last shovelful of
dirt on Evans's grave: "We now overrule Evans insofar
as it holds that the Compensation Clause forbids Congress to apply a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax to the salaries of federal judges,
whether or not they were appointed before enactment
of the tax." 7 Also not surprisingly, the Court, over the
dissents of Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, upheld the application of the Medicare tax to
federal judges. But, to our surprise, the Court held that
the extension of the OASDI tax to those judges sitting
in 1983 was in fact discriminatory and, therefore, invalid under ·the Compensation Clause, even though
Congress hadn't intended to single out the judiciary
for unfavorable treatment. All seven participating justices (Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens
were recused) thought the OASDI tax was constitutionally infirm as applied to Judge Hatter and other judges
sitting in 1983.8
We think that, given the purpose of the Compensation Clause, the Court got the OASDI issue wrong, as
we'll demonstrate later. But in Part I we'll first explain
the real -significance of Hatter - that it's now hard to
imagine any realistic situation in which a federal taxing

253 u.s. 245 (1920).
The Court in Evans concluded that extending the income
tax to federal judges violated the Compensation Clause, but
Evans was eviscerated in 1939. See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307
U.S. 277 (1939); Entin and Jensen, supra note 2, at 1548. Because the Supreme Court hadn't explicitly overruled Evans,
however, the Federal Circuit reasonably treated the case a·s if
it had effect. See Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1790; Entin and Jensen,
supra note 2, at 1550.
7
Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1790. Six of the seven participating
justices voted to overturn Evans. In his opinion concurring
on the OASDI tax issue but dissenting on the Medicare tax,
Justice Scalia wrote, "The Court's decision today simply
recognizes what should be obvious: that Evans has not only
been undermined, but has in fact collapsed." Id. at 1798. Only
Justice Thomas thought Evans was rightly decided. See infra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
8The Court added that the infirmity of the tax wasn't cured
by later increases in judicial compensation. Hatter, 121 S. Ct.
at 1796-97.
5

1

The Court's opinion is at 121 S. Ct. 1782 (2001), Doc 200114515 (33 original pages), 2001 TNT 99-8.
2
Jonathan L. Entin and Erik M. Jensen, "Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial Independence: Hatter v. United
States," Tax Notes, Mar. 12, 2001, p. 1541.
3
Before 1983, most federal employees, including judges,
were exempt from social security taxes because of the retirement systems established by the federal government on their
behalf. But the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 subjected federal judges to the Medicare tax, Pub. L. No.
97-248, tit. II, subtit. E, pt. III, section 278, 96 Stat. 324, 559-63
(amending 26 U.S.C. section 3121), and tl-te Social Security
Amendments of 1983 imposed the OASDI wage tax on the
judges. Pub. L. No. 98-21, section 101(b)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 69
(amending 26 U.S.C. section 3121).
4
The Compensation Clause provides that federal judges
"shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. Const. art. III, section 1.
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statute could be deemed to violate the Compensation
Clause. If we're right about that, the OASDI tax
analysis, discussed in Part II of the article, is an historical artifact; it matters to the judges involved, of
course, but it will have no effect on the development
of the law.

I. Compensation and Taxation After Hatter
The most important part of Hatter is the repudiation,
once and for all, of the core of Evans v. Gore and the
acceptance of the proposition that the Compensation
Clause affects only those taxes that discriminate
against the judiciary. The narrow holding involving the
OASDI tax, which depended on a determination that
there was discrimination, reflected a set of special facts
that can't be duplicated, or even approached, in the
future. The Compensation Clause should therefore
never again have any serious effect on the national
taxing power.
As we argued in our first article, the Compensation
Clause was part of the constitutional structure designed to protect the judiciary against interference
from other governmental branches, particularly Congress. The concern was judicial independence, not
preserving the economic positions of federal judges. 9
A tax of general application, one that isn't directed at
the judiciary in general or at individual judges in particular, shouldn't implicate the clause.
The Court's general pronouncements in Hatter are
perfectly consistent with that understanding of the
Compensation Clause. As Justice Stephen G. Breyer
wrote for the Court, "In our view, the Clause does not
prevent Congress from imposing a 'non-discriminatory
tax laid generally' upon judges and other c~tizens, ...
but it does prohibit taxation that singles out judges for
specially unfavorable treatment." 10
When taxation is involved, the Compensation
Clause analysis is therefore different from that used in
examining congressional actions affecting judicial
salaries. In 1980 the Court had decided, in United States
v. Will, 11 that Congress may not reduce judicial salaries,
even if done as part of a nondiscriminatory cost-cutting
move. But, with taxation, the only concern is whether
there has been discrimination against the judiciary in
a way that might damage judicial independence. As
Justice Breyer wrote in Hatter,
[T]here is no good reason why a judge should not
share the tax burdens borne by all citizens. We
concede that this Court [in Will] has held that the
Legislature cannot directly reduce judicial salaries
even as part of an equitable effort to reduce all
Government salaries .... But a tax law ... affects

9

See Entin and Jensen, supra note 2, at 1543-45.
Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1787 (quoting O'Malley v. Woodrough,
307 U.S. 277, 282 (1939)). Five of tlie seven justices agreed
with this proposition. Justices Scalia and Thomas both thir:k
the Clause could forbid an increase in tax burdens that IS
nondiscriminatory in nature. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
11
449 u.s. 200 (1980).
10
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compensation indirectly, not directly .... [The]
prophylactic considerations that may justify an
absolute rule forbidding direct salary reductions
are absent here . . . . In practice, the likelihood
that a nondiscriminatory tax represents a disguised legislative effort to influence the judic~al
will is virtually nonexistent. Hence the potential
threats to judicial independence that underlie the
Constitution's compensation guarantee cannot
justify a special judicial exemption from a commonly shared tax, not even as a preventive measure to counter those threats. 12
We agree completely. Where we diffe~ with the
Court is in its conclusion that the extenswn of the
OASDI tax to sitting judges - the elimination of a tax
exemption to which judges had been entitled - was
in fact discriminatory. As we'll discuss in Part II, we're
unconvinced that Congress "single[d] out judges for
specially unfavorable treatment" 13 in a way that should
implicate the Compensation Clause.

With Evans overruled, no longer can
anyone seriously argue that federal
judges are exempt from a generally
applicable income tax or from, say, an
increase in rates under a generally
applicable income tax.
But whatever the merits of the Court's consideration
of the OASDI tax, that analysis should have no effect
on the subsequent treatment of taxation under the
Compensation Clause. A Hatter-like set of facts, involving the repeal of a tax exemption for f~d~ral judges,
can't arise again: As far as we know, no s1~rular ~xemp
tions remain on the books, and Congress IS unhkely to
exempt federal judges from any other gen~rally applicable tax in the future. 14 Moreover, as J~shce Brey.er
noted in Hatter, the likelihood that a facially nondiscriminatory tax could represent an attack on the
judiciary is "virtually nonexistent." 15 As a result, a
federal income tax could raise Compensation Clause

12
Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1792 (citations omitted). In our first
article we noted that the Court had yet to decide whether a
facially neutral statute motivated by a c.ongres~ion~l intent
to influence the judiciary could ever fml constltu honal requirements. See Entin and Jensen, supra note 2, at 1543 n.6
(citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 226 n.30 (1980)). The
quoted language from Hatter seems to resolve that issue, at
least for taxing statutes.
13
Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1787. Justice Scalia thinks that discrimination is unnecessary to invalidate a tax under the Compensation Clause, see infra note 16, and Justic~ T~wmas
apparently thinks that any ir:come ta:x unconstitutiOnally
diminishes judicial compensation. See mfra notes 17-18 and
accompanying text.
14
We doubt there would be political support for such an
exemption to begin with, and the result in H~tter, ma~i~g it
difficult for Congress to get rid of an exemptw~ once It s on
the books, is an additional deterrent to creatmg any new
exemption.
15
See supra text accompanying note 12.
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issues after Hatter only if Congress were to target the
tax (or part of the tax) at federal judges. Such a discriminatory tax makes for a nice classroom hypothetical, but it's not a real world possibility.l 6
With Evans overruled, no longer can anyone seriously argue that federal judges are exempt from a generally applicable income tax or from, say, an increase in
rates under a generally applicable income tax. Although Justice Thomas, in a two-sentence opinion,
wrote that the "Court was correct in Evans v. Gore ...
when it held that any tax that reduces a judge's net
compensation violates Article III of the Constitution," 17
that statement is far removed from the common understanding of the last 60 years.1 8

II. The OASDI Tax Analysis
As we've suggested, the Court's analysis of the
OASDI tax is unlikely to have significance for the
development of the law. But it's still worth explaining
why we think the Court's position isn't persuasive.
The difficulty with the extension of the OASDI tax
to federal judges, concluded the Court, was that the
extension did in fact discriminate against the judges.
We'll explain below that the Court's conclusion places
Congress in a kind of Catch-22: Judges were the main
targets of the 1983 OASDI extension in part because
the Court itself had suggested that Congress couldn't
apply the OASDI tax to the federal judiciary when the
Social Security Act was passed in 1935. Even without
that problem, though, the Court's reasoning is questionable.
The conclusion that the extension of the OASDI tax
discriminated against federal judges resulted from a
complicated, four-step analysis presented by Justice
Breyer. First, because of retirement plans already in
place, federal employees had been outside the social
security system before enactment of the 1983 changes.
Second, the 1983 changes in fact didn't increase the

16
Justice Scalia's position also appears to be irrelevant to
future analysis. Scalia criticized the Court's emphasis on discrimination, which the Compensation Clause doesn't mention. Instead, he would seek to determine whether a tax
exemption has become part of judges' "compensation." Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1798. If so, the exemption couldn't be
eliminated for sitting judges, whether or not discrimination
against the judiciary is involved. Moreover, Scalia determined that "a tax-free status conditioned on federal employment is compensation," id. at 1799, leading to his conclusion
that the imposition of the Medicare tax on sitting judges was
impermissible. But since judges no longer have sudi "comrensatory" tax exemptions, none of this should matter for
the future.
17
Id. at 1800 (citation omitted).
18
In the context of Hatter, that position meant only that
Justice Thomas thought the Medicare tax should have been
struck down as well as the OASDI tax. But the implications
of Justice Thomas's statement are astonishing. He seems to
be suggesting that federal judges are constitutionally exempt
from all income tax obligations. One of us (Jensen) has
originalist leanings, but ev.en he thinks the idea that the
Compensation Clause bars application of a tax of general
application to federal judges is totally inconsistent with the
original purpose of the Clause.
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financial obligations of nearly all (96 percent) federal
employees in office at that time because those employees were given the choice whether to enter the
social security system or not. 19 While in form the
remaining 4 percent of the federal employees seemed
to have no such choice, it was in fact only the federal
judges and a few insignificant other offi~ials (like the
president)2° - people whose government retirement
plans were noncontributory - who were hurt financially by the 1983 changes in the law. 21 Third, the
federal judges had to pay more, and got nothing in
return. Because of pre-judicial employment, nearly all
were already fully insured under the social security
system. Finally, said the Court, the changes didn't
serve to "'equaliz[e]' the retirement-related obligations
that pre-1983law imposed upon judges with the retirement-related obligations that pre-1983 law imposed
upon other current high-level federal employees." 22
To put the argument more simply: federal judges,
and (with an exception or two) only federal judges, had
increased tax obligations from the 1983 changes, with
no compensating benefits. That's discriminatory and
therefore inconsistent with the Compensation Clause.
We're not convinced. The Court's analysis required
a lengthy series of steps, and suppositions, to come to
the determination that the statutory effects were discriminatory. The level of detail required to conclude
that the Compensation Clause was violated was extraordinary when, as Justice· Breyer noted, there was
no evidence whatsoever that Congress was acting to
single out the judiciary for unfortunate consequences,
and the effect·of the legislation was merely to bring the
judiciary into the broadly applicable social security
system. It's true that sitting judges were harmed economically by the 1983 changes, but we don't see how
judicial independence was implicated by these congressional actions.
Justice Breyer supplied a response to that criticism,
but it was totally unsatisfactory. He suggested that if

19

Newly hired employees were given no such choice.
The President's pension is noncontributory .... And
the President himself, like the judges, is protected
against diminution in his "[c]ompensation." ... These
facts may help establish congressional good faith. But,
as we have said, we do not doubt that good faith. And
we do not see why, otherwise, the separate and special
example of that single individual, the President,
should make a crucial difference here.
Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1796 (citations omitted). That single individual indeed!
21
The retirement plan for judges is noncontributory, wrote
Justice Breyer, because the Constitution permits judges to
"draw a salary for life simply by continuing to serve .... That
fact means that a contributory system, irt all likelihood,
would not work." Id. at 1794 (citation omitted). That
likelihood, said Breyer, gave a constitutional dimension to
the plan arrangements: "The 1983 statute consequently
singles out judges for adverse treatment solely because of a
feature required by the Constitution to preserve judicial independence." Id. Whatever the difficulties with a contributory plan, we don't see how a noncontributory plan is
"required" by the Constitution.
20
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the rules were otherwise, Congress could secretly
punish the judges while professing high-minded goals:
The Government also argues that there is no
evidence here that Congress singled out judges
for special treatment in order to intimidate, influence, or punish them. But this Court has never
insisted upon such evidence. To require it is to
invite legislative efforts that embody, but lack
evidence of, some such intent, engendering
suspicion among the branches and consequently
undermining that mutual respect that the Constitution demands .... Nothing in the record discloses anything other than benign congressional
motives. If the Compensation Clause is to offer
meaningful protection, however, we cannot limit
that protection to instances in which the Legislature manifests, say, direct hostility to the
Judiciary. 23
The posited concern about a vast congressional conspiracy is hard to take seriously. It's inconceivable that
Congress - a group of 535 very independent, very
voluble people - could ever take an action motivated
by such hostility without leaving traces along the way.
Judicial independence wasn't affected one whit by the
1983 changes, and that should have been enough to
decide the case. 24
At a more fundamental level, the Court's elaborate
analysis of the OASDI tax issue ignores the context in
which Congress was legislating. Now that Hatter has
been decided, we know that the OASDI tax could constitutionally have been imposed on federal judges at
the same time it was imposed on other Americans.
Judicial income can be reached by a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax, and the OASDI tax
could have been structured in a nondiscr:iminatory
way. But the long shadow of Evans v. Gore perhaps
helps to explain why federal judges were exempted
from the OASDI tax when the Social Security Act was

adopted: Evans strongly suggested that extending this
new tax to sitting judges, like the extension of the income tax to the judiciary that was rejected in 1920,
would have run afoul of the Compensation Clause. 25
Hatter seems to mean that after Congress forwent
the opportunity to tax jtldges, it was stuck with that
result. Already sitting judges were entitled to the benefit of the exemption for the rest of their judicial lives;
taking the exemption away would have been discriminatory. That's a difficult result to justify. In a very
real sense, the Court was responsible for the exemption
that it now says Congress couldn't eliminate with0ut
affecting judicial independence.

III. Conclusion
The congressional taxing power is very broad,
despite the specific limitations on that power contained
on the Constitution. For many years, the Compensation
Clause was considered such a limitation, and, in fact,
the Supreme Court used the Clause in Hatter to strike
down one exercise of the taxing power affecting the
federal judiciary. But that specific result in Hatter is
misleading. The real significance of Hatter is this: With
the explicit (and long overdue) repudiation of Evans v.
Gore, we should now be able to forget about the Compensation Clause as a limitation on the taxing power.

25
When the social security system was developed, the
Court hadn't yet expressed doubt about Evans. It wasn't until
1939 that the Court eviscerated Evans without overruling it.
See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939).

23

Id. at 1795-96 (citations omitted).
We understand that the Court continues to insist that the
Compensation Clause serves a function in addition to furthering judicial independence:
Evans properly added that these guarantees of compensation and life tenure exist, "not to benefit the judges,"
but "as a limitation imposed in the public interest."
... They "promote the public weal," ... in part by
helping to induce "learned" men and women "to quit
the lucrative pursuits" of the private sector, ... but
more importantly by helping to secure an independence of mind and spirit necessary if judges are "to
maintain that nice adjustment between individual
rights and governmental powers which constitutes
political liberty .... "
Id. at 1791 (quoting Evans, 253 U.S. at 253, 248; 1 James Kent,
Commentaries on American Law *294; and Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 143 (1911)). We'll have
more to say about this Compensation-Clause-as-recruitmentperk rationale in another .forum. Suffice it to say for present
purposes that we don't think that the Clause was originally
intended to convince well-to-do lawyers to forgo their "lucrative
pursuits," and, original understanding aside, we don't want a
federal bench made up of people who subordinate public service to the desire for economic gain. See also Entin and Jensen,
supra note 2, at 1549.
24

676

lltncrgiBe 6fl, fJflfl J:ax ~~f!fe:ssiaBt~ls.
.
Rt ¥auv l/JetJk ana GaZl.
.!O©o-oo
The ultimate contact reference, The Tax Directory puts over
60,000 tax professionals at your fmgertips. The Tax Directory
is a comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-date three volume
reference you can rely on to fmd any tax professional you need.
Available in print, CD-ROM, on the Web and LEXIS. The Tax
Directory is continuously updated. If you need to get in touch
with a tax professional, turn to The Tax Directory for help.

• Government Officials Worldwide lists over 15,000 U.S.
federal, U.S. state, and international government officials.

• Private Sector Professionals Worldwide provides
information on more than 25,000 domestic and 16,000
international tax professionals.

• Corporate Tax Managers Worldwide features information
on nearly 10,000 tax executives representing publicly and
privately held U.S. and foreign companies.

For more information or to order,
call800.955.3444 or visit www.tax.org!
TAX NOTES, July 30, 2001

